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1.0.  INTRODUCTION 
1. 1. 1.  StandardIzatIon  and  the  protect I on  of  I nte I I ectua I 
property  serve  different  objectives  but  have  to  co~exist 
in  the  same  Industrial  and  commercial  environment. 
Standardization  aims  at  diffusing  technology  in  ~t~e 
public  Interest,  while  Intellectual  property  rights  aim 
to  secure  private  property  protection.  The 
standardizatLon  process  cannot  take  place  effectively  If 
no  clear  solutions  exist  to  resolve  potential  confl lets 
between  the  objectives  of  standardization  and  the 
pr inc i p 1 es  of  1 nte  1 1 ectua  1  property  rIghts.  At  the  same 
time,  the  Incentive  to develop  new  products  and  processes 
on  which  to  base  future  standardization  w I I I  be  I ost  If 
the  standard-making  process  Is  carrIed  out  wIthout  due 
regard  for  Intellectual  property  rights. 
1.1.2.  In  December  1991  the  Commission  published  Its  follow  up 
to  the  Green  Paper  on  standards  (COM( 91)  521)  In  wh lch  l't 
was  stated,  In  paragraph  (xi)  (other  Issues  71),  that  the 
CommIssIon  wou I d  we I come  the  deve I opment  by  standards 
bodies  of  clear  conditions  for  the  Inclusion.  of 
Intellectual  property  rights  in  standards,  based  on 
practice  in  the  international  standardlzat,lon 
organizations.  It  was  further  Indicated  that  "In  view  of 
the  importance  and  comp I ex I ty  of  the  Issue  for 
Intellectual  property  rights,  standardization, 
competition  and  trade  pol lcles",  the  Commission  Intended 
to  produce  a  separate communication  on  the subject. 
1.1.3.  Given  the  voluntary  nature  of  standard-maKing,  the 
Commission  Is  not  seeKing  to  regulate  standard-maKing 
directly  by  legislative  proposals,  If  certain  principles 
are  not  respected  by  standards  bodies  the  Community  wl  I I 
not  be  able  to  use  their  standards  and  even  less,  to make 
them  mandatory.  Certain  types  of  behaviour  on  the  part 
eIther  of  standards  bodIes,  or  on  the  part  of  hoI de.r~  of 
I nte I I ectua 1  property  r  1 ghts  cou 1 d  bring.  t.hem  t'rto 
confl let  with  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty,  of  Community 
or  national  legislation,  or  of  international  co~~e~t16ns. 
1. 1. 4.  Therefore  In  th 1 s  CommunI cat I on  the CommIssIon  sets out  a  .. 
number  of  pr Inc I pIes  whIch  It  be I I eves  shou I d  form  th~ 
bas Is  of  any  I nterna I  ru I es  whIch  standards  bodIes  may 
wish  to  elaborate.  Standards  bodies  remain  free  to 
structure  their  membership  rules  and  their  internal 
organ I zat I ona I  procedures  as  they  wIsh.  The  resu Its  of 
their  activity,  must,  however  correspond  to  the 
standardization  needs  of  the  Community  and  must  be  made 
In  conformIty  w 1 th  the  1 aws  of  the  CommunIty  and  Its 
international  obi igations. - 2  -
2  .. 0.  PRINCIPLES  AND  OBJECTIVES  OF  STANDARDIZATION 
2.1.  TYPES  OF  STANDARDS 
2.1.1.  A  standard  Is  a  technical  specification  relating  to  a 
product  or  an  operatIon  whIch  Is  recognIzed  by  a  I arge 
number  of  manufacturers  and  users.  Councl I  Directive 
83/189(1)  lays  down  the  following  definition  In  Its 
Article  (2)  "standard  shall  mean  a  technical 
specification  approved  by  a  recognized  standardizing  body 
for  repeated  and  continuous  application  compliance  with 
which  Is  In  principle  not  compulsory". 
It  may  be  the  result  of  a  formal  consensus-bul ldlng 
procedure managed  by  a  recognized  standardization  body  In 
order  to  permit  a  large  number  of  manufacturers  to  adopt 
identical  solutions.  Alternatively,  the  standard  may 
arise  spontaneously  by  the  degree  of  penetration  of  the 
market  of  a  particular  technical  solution  (a  so-called 
"de  facto"  or  "proprietary"  standard). 
2.1.2.  Standards  may  be  developed  for  a  wide  variety  of 
purposes,  rangIng  from  term I no I ogy  and  testIng  to 
detal led  technical  specifications  for  products,  processes 
and  services.  They  may  be  I lmlted  to  ensuring 
compa  t  I b I I I ty  of  products  or  systems  at  theIr  poInts  of 
Interconnection,  or  may  extend  to detal led  specifications 
In  respect  of  the  design,  dimensions  and  materials of  the 
products  themse I ves.  In  genera I  terms,  the  CommunIty 
along  with  other  Parties  to  the  Agreement  on  Technical 
Barriers  to  Trade  of  the  GATT  ("TBTA")  Is  committed  to 
specIfy 1 ng  techn 1  ca 1  regu 1 at  1  ons  and  standards  In  terms 
of  performance  rather  than  design  or  descriptive 
characteristics. 
OBJECTIVES  OF  STANDARDIZATION 
2.1.3.  In  the  majority  of  Industries,  the  objective  of  the 
manufacturer  whose  product  becomes  a  "de  facto"  standard 
may  not  be,  at  the outset  of  the  commercial lzatlon of  the 
technology,  to  see  It  become  an  Industry  standard.  The 
objective  of  most  manufacturers  remains  to  achieve  high 
levels  of  market  penetration  and  to  be  competitive  In 
those markets  In  relation  to other manufacturers. 
In  certain  Industries,  where  a  high  degree  of 
standardization  Is  taking  place,  manufacturers  must  now, 
however,  be  aware  of  the  posslbl I lty  that  some  of  their 
new  technology  may  eventually  form  the  basis  of  an 
industry  standard. 
(1)  83/189/EEC:  Counci I  Directive  of  28  March  1983  laying 
down  a  procedure  for  the  provision  of  Information  In 
the  field  of  technical  standards  and  regulations. 
OJ  N°  L  109,  26/04/83  p.  08 - 3  -
2. 1. 4.  If  a  new  product  has  e I ements  protected  by  I nte  I I ectua I 
property  legislation,  as  Is  most  likely  to  be  the  case, 
the  manufacturer  w I I I  exercIse  those  I nte  I I ectua I 
property  rIghts  vIgorous I y,  as  a  means  of  securIng  and 
maIntaInIng  hIs  I ead  and  hIs  prof i tab I I I ty  In  a  gIven 
terrI tory.  In  many  hIgh  techno I ogy  IndustrIes,  the 
h 1 ghest  costs  are  incurred  In  the  research  and 
deve I opment  phase  when  the  i nte  I I ectua I  input  In  terms  of 
man-hours  of  work  Is  at  Its  greatest,  the  manufacturing 
phase  being  a  relatively  low-cost  operation.  The  economic 
value  of  the  Intellectual  property  rights  in  such  a 
product  wl I  I  therefore  constitute  an  important  factor  In 
prIce  ca I cuI at Ions  and  fIgures  promInent I y  as  a  company 
asset. 
2.1 .5.  Once  a  certain  level  of  penetration  of  the  relevant 
market  for  his  product  has  been  achieved,  the 
manufacturer  w I I I  'de  facto'  have  set  the  Industry 
standard  for  that  product  and  It  will  be  difficult,  If 
not  Impossible,  for  others  whose  products  must 
I nteroperate  wIth  hIs,  to  avoId  workIng  to  the  standard 
whIch  he  has  set.  ThIs  w I I I  be  part I cuI ar I y  the  case 
where  I nterwork I ng  or  networkIng  Is  I nvo I ved,  as  In  the 
computer,  energy  distribution,  telecommunications  and 
transport  industrIes. 
2.1 .6.  Once  a  certain  level  of  market  penetration  has  been 
achieved,  the  manufacturer  whose  product  has  become  a  de 
facto  standard  may  accept  that  de  facto  standardization 
can  be  advantageous I y  converted  Into  a  forma I  standard 
so  that  the  dominance  of  his  technology  Is  embodied  In  a 
more  permanent  form.  His  objective  wl I I  then  be  to 
secure  the  best  terms  from  the  conversion  of  his  de  facto 
standard  Into  a  formal  standard. 
2. 1. 7.  These  terms  may  Inc I ude  roya I ty  payments  for  the  use  of 
his  Intellectual  property  and  the  grant  of  I lcences  on  a 
territorial  basis  for  the  exploitation  of  these 
I nte  I  I ectua I  property  rIghts.  These  rIghts  Inc I ude  the 
right  to  centro I  manufacture  and  the  rIght  to  centro  I 
distribution,  including  lmportatlon. 
2.1.8.  A  longer  term  benefit  wl I 1  probably  accrue  to  the 
manufacturer  who  vo I untar I I y  I I cences  hIs  techno I ogy  to 
become  a  standard  since  his  market  share  wl 11  eventually 
grow  significantly  In  respect  of  the  rights  for  which  he 
receIves  roya I ty  payments  even  If  he  Is  no  I onger  the 
sole  manufacturer  of  the  product  Itself,  and  even  If  the 
royalty  rate which  he  receives  Is  less  than  that  which  he 
would  have  obtained  from  a  1 lcensee  on  the  open  market. 
2.1.9.  He  wi II  also  be  able  to  satisfy  a  second  longer  term 
objective which  is  to  see  the  technology  developed  by  his 
company  estab I i shed  as  a  wor I dw I de  standard  wIth 
resulting  beneficial  publ lcity. - 4  -
2,1.10.  On  the  other  hand,  a  standard  may  arise  by  a  process  of 
definition  and  approval  by  a  recognized  national  or 
International  standardization  body. 
2.1.11.  The  underlying  objective  of  formal  standardization  Is  to 
generate  the  economic  benefits  for  society  that  will 
result  from  a  more  rational  organization  of  supply  and 
demand  and  greater  competition  In  the  market  place. 
Standard 1 zat ion  tends  to  reduce  costs  for  the  supp I I er 
and  purchaser  of  goods  and  services  and  to  Increase 
transparency  of  the market.  Once  the  requirements  of  the 
market  are  ref I ected  In  a  standard,  a  I I  Interested 
suppl lers are  put  In  a  position  to meet  market  needs  on  a 
competitive  basis.  At  the  same  time,  purchasers  are 
given  common  assurances  with  respect  to  the  performance 
of  the  product  or  servIce  agaInst  agreed  crIterIa  of 
qua I I ty,  I nteroperab I I I ty,  and  so  on.  The  Importance  of 
standardIzatIon  as  II an  1 nst  rument  of  economIc  and 
IndustrIa I  1 ntegrat 1  on  wIthIn  the  European  market  II  has 
recently  been  expl lcltly  recognized  by  the Councl I  In  Its 
Resolution  on  the  role of  European  Standardization  In  the 
European  Economy  of  18  June  1992.(2) 
2.1.12.  These  economic  objectives  can,  of  course,  only  be 
rea I I zed  Insofar  as  standards  are  made  known  and 
ava I I ab I e  to  the  wIdest  poss I b I e  number  of  Interested 
partIes  on  fair  and  reasonab I e  terms.  Consequent 1  y,  a 
standard  Is  by  def 1 n 1 t  1  on  a  pub 1 1  c 1 y-ava 1 1 ab 1  e 
document(3)  and  the  technical  specification  which  Is 
not  aval lable  to alI  potential  users  Is  not  a  standard. 
2.1.13.  Benefits  to  purchasers  and  users  accrue  from  the 
existence  of  a  recognized  standard  guaranteeing  not  only 
lnteroperablllty  but  also  a  certain  level  of  quality, 
safety  and  conformity  to  certain  technical  norms.  A 
European  standard  can  fInd  I tse If  In  competItIon  wIth 
standards  set  by  other  major  tradIng  partners  such  as 
the  American  or  Far  Eastern markets. 
2.1.14.  The  objectives  of  standardization  can  only  be  met  If  the 
techno I ogy  chosen  Is  good,  up-to-date  and  read 1 1  y 
aval fable.  The  standardization  process  Is,  however,  by 
Its  consensus-driven  nature,  a  lengthy  one,  and  when 
substantial  delays  In  adopting  a  standard  occur,  the 
technology  on  which  the  standard  Is  based  may  already  be 
out  of  date.  On  the  other  hand,  the  most  Innovative 
technology  may  not  be  the  most  appropriate  for  adoption 
as  a  standard  because  it  Is  not  yet  stab I e  and 
sufficiently tested  in  the market  place. 
(2)  OJ  no  173  of  9. 7 .92,  p.l 
( 3)  See  ISO/IEC 
definitions 
activities". 
Guide  2, 
concerning 
"Genera I  terms  and  theIr 
standardization  and  related - 5  -
2 ..  1 . 15  Once  chosen  as  a  standard,  a  part I cuI ar  techn I ca I 
so I utI on  tends  to  perpetuate  I tse If  for  a  per I od  I onger 
than  that  which  It  might  have  enJoyed  on  the  open  market 
In  a  free  competitive situation  and  therefore  the  process 
of  standardIzatIon  may  i tse If  retard  techno I og I ca I 
Innovation  in  some  areas. 
2.1.16  It  Is  also  the  case  that  too  much  standardization  In  a 
given  area  at  a  particular  moment  In  time  may  create 
difficulties  as  that  technology  changes.  Replacing  a 
substantial  standardized  "platform"  such  as  a  main-frame 
computer  operating  system  wIth  a  new  and  more  advanced 
standard I zed  "pI at  form"  may  prove  more  cost I y  and  more 
difficult  than  the  addition  of  new  layers  of  system 
software  on  to existing  products. 
2.1.17  A  variety  of  approaches  to  the  Issue  of  standardization 
are  therefore  requIred  If  the  most  approprIate  form  of 
standardization  for  a  particular  industry  Is  to  be 
achieved. 
2.2.  PRINCIPLES  USED  IN  NATIONAL  AND  INTERNATIONAL  STANDARDS 
BODIES 
2.2.1.  The  three  European  standards-making  bodies  recognized  by 
the  CommunIty  at  a  European  I eve I  are  CEN,  CENELEC  and 
ETS I .  CEN  (European  CommIt tee  for  StandardIzatIon)  and 
CENELEC  (European  Committee  for  Electro-Technical 
StandardIzatIon)  creai:e  standards  for  EC  and  EFTA 
countries.  Their  membership  Is  composed  of  national 
standards  bodies  and  national  electrotechnlcal  committees 
respectively.  ETSI  (European  Telecommunications  Standards 
InstItute)  created  In  1988  fo 1 1 ow 1 ng  the  recommendatIon 
made  In  the Commission's  Green  Paper  on  Standards,  groups 
together  administrations,  network  operators,  users, 
manufacturers  research  I nst I tut Ions  and  prIvate  servIce 
providers  and  has  the  task  of  draftIng  European 
Telecommunications  Standards. 
2.2.2.  At  the  International  level,  ISO,  IEC  and  CCITT 
(International  Telegraph  and  Telephone  Consultative 
Committee)  are  the  standard-making  organizations.  ISO 
(International  Organization  for  Standardization)  draws 
Its  membership  from  national  standards  organizations. 
The  IEC  (International  Electrotechnlcal  Commission)  has  a 
simi tar  but  smaller  membership  In  the  field  of 
electronics  and  electrical  engineering. 
2.2.3.  The  pr lnclples  applied  to  Intellectual  property  by 
ISO/IEC  and  by  CEN/CENELEC  are  relatively  simple. 
Subparagraphs  b)  and  c)  of  Annex  A  of  the  1 so  document 
(Reference  to  patented  items  IEC/ISO  Directives- Part  2 
Methodology  for  the  development  of  'nternatlonal 
standards)  are  app I I ed  by  a I I  four  bodIes.  r hey  read  as 
fo I I ows: - 6  -
b)  "1 f  the  propos  a 1  is  accepted  on  techn i ca I  grounds, 
the  originator  shal I  ask  any  known  patent  holder 
for  a  statement  that  he  would  be  wl I  I ing  to 
negot 1  ate  I i cences  under  patent  and  I Ike  rIghts 
with  appl !cants  throughout  the world  on  reasonable 
terms  and  conditions.  A  record  of  the  patent 
holder's  statement  shal 1  be  placed  In  the  fl les  of 
the  ISO  Central  Secretariat  or  the  IEC  Central 
Off ice,  as  approprIate,  and  sha I  I  be  refer  red  to 
In  the  reI evant  I nternat I ona I  Standard.  If  the 
patent  hoI der  does  not  prov  1  de  such  a  statement, 
the  Technical  Committee  shal I  not  proceed  with  the 
Inc I us I on  of  the  patented  Item  un I ess  the 
respective  Counci I  gives  permission 
c)  Should  It  be  revealed  after  publication  of  the 
Inter  nat I on  a I  Standard  that  I I cences  under  a 
patent  and  I ike  rIghts  cannot  be  obtaI ned  under 
reasonable  terms  and  conditions,  the  International 
Standard  sha I  I  be  referred  back  to  the  Techn I ca I 
Committee  for  further  consideration." 
2.2.4.  CCITT  In  Its  Annex  5  Statement  on  CCITT  patent  policy 
elaborated  In  June  1988  made  the  following  observations. 
"Over  the  years  the  CCITT  has  developed  a  "code  of 
practice"  regarding  patents ...  The  rules  of  this  "code 
of  practice"  are  rather  simple  and  straight  forward ... 
the  detal led  arrangements  being  left  to  the  parties 
Involved,  as  these  arrangements  might  differ  from  case  to 
case" . 
2.2.5.  ETSI  has  drafted  a  Pol Icy  and  Undertaking  on  Intellectual 
Property  RIghts  whIch  sets  out  more  deta i  I ed  procedura I 
rules  and  which  starts  from  two  premises  which  differ 
from  those  app I  I cab I e  In  I SO/ I EC/CEN  or  CENELEC.  The 
first  premise  Is  that  membership  of  ETSI  is  conditional 
on  sIgnature  of  the  Undertak 1  ng  whereby  an  I nte  I  I ectua I 
property  right  (  IPR)  holder  agrees  to  I icence  his  IPRs 
according  to  certain  limitations  as  to  royalties.  The 
second  premise  Is  that  ETSI  standards  are  aval lable  In  a 
specific  geographical  area  as  a  consequence  of  the 
definition  of  territory  contained  within  the  draft 
Undertaking.  Certain  conditions  are  specific  to 
signatories  of  the  Undertaking.  This  Pol Icy  and 
Undertaking  has  not  yet  been  approved  by  the  ETSI 
membership. - 7  -
2,3.  THE  USE  OF  STANDARDS  BY  PUBLIC  AUTHORITIES 
2.3.1.  Because  standards  represent  a  voluntary  consensus 
concerning  the  technical  characteristics  of  goods  and 
services,  they  are  commonly  used  by  public  authorities 
within  the  framework  of  regulation.  This  may  take  the 
form  of  a  direct  reference  in  ieglslatlon  which  makes  a 
given  standard  mandatory  or,  as  Is  normally  the  case  In 
the  Community,  of  conferring  a  "presumption  of 
conformity"  to  legislation  on  any  product  which  compl les 
with  the  standard.  Directives  based  on  reference  to 
standards  have  been  adopted  In  a  number  of  important 
industries,  Including  mechanical  engineering, 
construction,  medical  devices,  telecommunications,  gas 
appl lances  and  measuring  Instruments. 
2.3.2.  Similarly,  publ lc  authorities  often  use  standards  In 
their  procurement.  WIthIn  the  CommunIty,  for  Instance, 
the  publ lc  procurement  Dlrectlves(4)  now  alI  require 
purchasing entitles to  define  technical  specifications  In 
their  contract  documents  by  reference  to  European 
standards  where  these  exist,  In  order  to  ensure  that 
national ly-determlned  specifications  are  not  used  to 
restrict access  to  procurement  markets. 
2. 3. 3.  Whenever  pub I i c  authoritIes  Incorporate  standards  Into 
legislation  and  thereby  confer  upon  them  a  more  binding 
character  than  theIr  norma I  vo I untary  status,  they  must 
satisfy  themselves  that: 
the  standards  In  question  have 
accordance  with  the  normal  procedures 
(I .e.  that  they  represent  a  consensus 
of  a  I I  Interested  partIes);  and 
been  developed  In 
of  standardization 
based  on  the  views 
- the  standards  In  question  are  aval fable  for  use  by  alI 
Interested parties  to  whom  the  legislation  appl les. 
International  agreements  subscribed  to  within  the 
framework  of  the  GATT  (  1 .e.  the  TBTA  and  to  a  lesser 
extent  the  Agreement  on  Government  procurement)  extend 
these  rIghts  of  non-d 1 scrm I natory  treatment  to  certaIn 
other  GATT  contracting  parties. 
2.3.4.  However,  providing  that  the  procedures  set  out  below  are 
followed,  even  in  the  exceptional  circumstances  where  a 
standard  becomes  'non-vo I untary' ,  prob I ems  can  be 
resolved  In  relation  to  Intellectual  property  rights. 
(4)  Directives  71/305/EEC,  77/62/EEC,  90/531/EEC - 8  -
2.3.5.  If  the  technological  solution  which  Is  to  be  made 
mandatory  is  based  on  proprietary  rIghts,  these  rIghts 
must  be  the  subject  of  negotiation  before  the  standard  Is 
agreed  and  the  technology  is made  mandatory. 
If  the  negotiations  fai I  to  produce  an  agreement  from  the 
rlghtholder,  the  rights  cannot  subsequently  be 
expropriated  unless  there are  over~ridlng public  Interest 
or  public  safety considerations  to  be  taken  Into  account 
and  no  other  technical  solution could  be  devised. 
2.3.6.  Therefore  the  question  of  the  use  of  standards  by  publ lc 
authorities does  not  hinge  on  the  question  of  whether  any 
Intellectual  property  rights  which  may  under I le  the 
standard  can  be  Incorporated  ex  post  facto  Into  a 
mandatory  standard,  s  I nee  such  rIghts  must  In  a I I  cases 
be  acquired  by  negotiation  and  not  by  legislative 
expropriation. - 9  -
3.0.  PRINCIPLES  OF  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  PROTECTION 
3.1.  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES 
3. 1 . 1 .  I nte I I ectua I  property  rIghts  inc I ude  patents,  trademarks, 
copyright,  design  rights,  semi-conductor  topography 
rights,  trade secrets.  Works  of  the  Intellect are created 
as  the  resu It  of  a  gIven  vo I ume  of  man-hours  of  I abour 
and  a  return  on  the  financial  Investment  In  that  labour 
cost  wl  I I  be  secured  only  If  the  creator  of  the  work  can 
control  how  his work  Is  to  be  exploited  and  where. 
3.2. 
3. 2. 1. 
General  principles  are 
I nte I I ectua I  property 
fo I I owIng  : 









the  Intellectual 
and,  If  the  right 
be  paid  for  that 
others  may  only  use  or  copy 
creation  with  his  permission 
holder  so  wishes,  he  may 
permission; 
In  order  to ensure  a  wider  distribution  and  use  of 
works  of  the  Intellect  In  society  as  a  whole, 
limits  are  set  on  the  scope  and  duration  of  the 
Intellectual  property  protection; 
the  abusive  exercise  of  Intellectual  property 
rights  by  Individuals  or  companies  occupying  a 
dominant  position  Is  subject  to  the  appl lcatlon  of 
competItIon  ru I es,  and  In  part I cuI ar  Art I c I e  85 
and  86  of  the  Treaty.  Agreements  between  companies 
regu I at I ng  the  exercIse  of  I nte I I ectua I  property 
rights  may  be  subject  to  the  prohibition  of 
Article 85  of  the  Treaty. 
Specific  characteristics  apply  to  each  type  of 
I n t e I I ec  t u a I  property  right.  So  In  the  case  of  patent 
rights,  the  object  of  the  right  Is  a  new  creative 
technical  solution  to  a  problem.  The  "invention"  must 
demonstrate  novelt:t  and  be  capable  of  an  Industrial 
app I I cat I on. - 10  -
3,.2.2.  The  patent  .right  will  only  be  granted  If  application 
formal ltles  are  completed  in  which  the  Inventive  step  Is 
described  In  d~~al r.  There  may  be_L period  during  which  a 
patent  appl lcatloh  Is  subject  to  examJnatlon  prior  to  the 
gra-nt  of  a  patent.  For  th.Ls  limited  period  of  time  the 
patent  appl lcatlon  Is  not  ful Jy  diScLosed  to  the  publ lc, 
although  the existence 6f  an  appl 16atlon  may  be  known. 
Once  a  patent  has  been  granted.  the  disclosure  to  the 
pub 1 I c  Is  compensated_  for  by  the  temporary  monopo I y  whIch 
the  patent  right  gives  over  the  exploitation  of  the 
patented  Invention. 
3.2.3.  That  monopoly  right  can  be  exercised  exclusively  by  the 
patent  holder  If  he  chooses  to  commerclallse  his 
Invent I on  h lmse 1 f.  1  f  ., n  certaIn  cIrcumstances  he  fa I Is 
to  work  his  patent  himself  o·r  If  he  chooses  to  license 
others  to  do  so,  he  may  never the I ess  be  remunerated  by 
others  for  the  right  to  be  a  I lcensee of  his patent. 
The  rIght  Is  not  subject  to  any  genera I  except Ions  In 
respect  of  use  by  potentially competing  third parties  but 
Is  limited  In  time  so  that  society  may  benefit  freely 
from  technical  progress  once  the  rlghtholder  has  had  the 
opportunIty  to  recover  hIs  or I gIna I  Investment  In 
research. 
3.2.4.  Patents  are  granted  on  a  territorial  basis,  that  Is  to 
say,  that  they  are  valid  for  the  country  In  which  they 
are  Issued,  or  In  the case  of  a  patent  Issued  by  the  EPO 
(European  Patent  Office)  they  may  be  val ld  for  up  to  17 
countries,  I .e.  those  of  the  Community  plus  Austria, 
Switzerland,  Sweden,  Monaco  and  Lichtenstein.  Rights 
acquired  under  patent  law  exhaust  only  on  expiry  of  the 
term  of  protect I on  In  the  terrI tory  for  whIch  they  are 
granted,  or,  on  the  non-payment  of  any  renewal  fees. 
3.3.  COPYRIGHT 
3. 3. 1.  CopyrIght,  by  contrast,  protects  not  nove I ty  but 
original lty.  This original lty  Is  assessed  In  relation  to 
the  express ion  used  by  the  creator  and  protect Jon  by 
copyright  cannot  apply  to  solutions,  principles,  Ideas, 
or  methods  as  such.  There  Is  no  monopoly  In  the  patent 
sense  under  copyright  protection  since  any  second  maker 
Is  free  to  find  his  own  way  to  express  an  Idea  which  he 
has  taken  from  the  work  of  another.  Even  In  techn I ca I 
fIe Ids  such  as  computer  programs  It  Is  except I ona I  for 
there  to  be  only  one  possible way  to  express  an  Idea. - 11  -
3.3.2.  In  cases  where  idea  and  expression  are  inseparable,  there 
is  generally  held  to  be  no  copyright  in  that  expression. 
The  on 1 y  monopo 1 y  under  copyrIght  I aw  Is  therefore  the 
rIght  of  the  author  to  prohibIt  the  unauthorIzed 
exploitation  of  the  expression  used  In  a  work,  for 
examp I e  to  prevent  the  copyIng  of  I I nes  of  text  from  a 
book  or  1 lnes  of  code of  a  computer  program. 
3.3.3.  A  work  Is  protected  under  copyright  law  as  soon  as  It  Is 
created.  Within  the  Community  and  according  to 
International  copyright  conventions  there  Is  no  need  to 
complete  registration  or  examination  formal ltles. 
However,  in  some  countries,  registration  formalities  do 
exist. 
3.3.4.  The  absence  of  any  requirement  In  the  Community  to 
register  a  copyright  means  that  only  I ltigatlon can  prove 
conclusively whether  a  val ld  copyright exists  In  relation 
to  a  part 1 cu 1 ar  work.  The  protect I on  exIsts  regard I ess 
of  whether  the  work  has  been  commercially  exploited  by 
Its  creator  or  not.  CopyrIght  Is  not  therefore  a 
compensation  to  the  author  for  disclosure  as  with  patent 
protect I on,  and  the  essence  of  the  copyrIght  cannot  be 
reduced  to  a  mere  right  to  remuneration. 
3.3.5.  Copyright  protection  Is  relatively  long,  at  least  50 
years  following  the  death  of  the  author  according  to  the 
relevant  International  conventions,  and  Is  a  territorial 
rIght.  A  work  created  or  pub I I shed  In  the  CommunIty, 
can  be  licensed  for  exploitation  only  within  the 
Community,  the  right  to  exploit  the  work  In,  for 
example,  the  US,  being  the  object  of  a  separate 
negotiation  by  the  rlghtholder. 
3.3.6.  A  I lmlted  number  of  exceptions  to  the exclusive copyright 
rights  are  provided  for  In  the  legislation  of  the  Member 
States  and  by  the  reI evant  Inter nat I on  a  I  conventIons  so 
that certain acts may  be  legitimately  performed  by  users. 
3.4.  SEMI-CONDUCTOR  PRODUCTS  AND  OTHER  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY 
RIGHTS 
3.4.1.  The  protection  given  In  the Community  to  the  topographies 
of  semi-conductor  products  ("chips")  should  also  be 
mentloned(5).  This  protection  Is  a  sui  generls  regime, 
I lmlted  to  chips  produced  within  the  Community,  although 
protection  can  be  extended,  on  the  basis  of  reciprocity, 
to chips  produced  In  third countries. 
(5)  Directive  81/54/EC - 12  -
The  protection  is  I imited  in  time  (10  years)  and  is 
re~tricted  In  scop~ by  exceptions  permitting  reproduction 
of.  a  topography  for  the  purpose  of  private  study  and  the 
developing  of  other  topographies,  I .e.  a  form  of  'reverse 
engineering'  exception. 
3.4.2.  Design  rights  have  not  yet  been  harmonized  throughout  the 
Community  and  a  variety  of  regimes  protecting  both 
functional  and  non-functional  designs  exist.  Some  regimes 
foresee  a  registration system. 
3.4.3.  Other  forms  of  Intellectual  property  such  as  trademarks, 
trade  secrets,  unfair  competition  do  not  appear  at  the 
present  tlme  to  cause  any  specific  problems  In  relation 
to  the  Issue  of  standards  and  are  therefore  excluded  from 
the  scope  of  this Communication. 
3.5.  EFFECTS  OF  AN  INTELLECTUAL  PROPERTY  RIGHT 
3.5.1.  Some  clarification  Is  necessary  as  to  what  acts  are 
permItted  or  proh I b 1 ted,  In  respect  of  I nte I I ectua I 
property  rIghts.  In  the  case  of  a  product  or  process 
Incorporating  a  patented  Invention,  the  part  of  the 
product  or  process  so  protected  cannot  be  copied  without 
authorization,  even  by  observing  the  Ideas  and  principles 
on  which  It  Is  based,  nor  can  Instructions  In  written 
form,  such  as  a  specification  or  patent  description,  be 
used  for  the  purpose  of  producing  a  similar  or  Identical 
result. 
3.~.2.  In  the  case  of  a  product  covered  by  copyright,  the  part 
of  the  product  so  protected  may  not  be  copIed  wIthout 
authorization  but  If  It  Is  accessible  to  the  human 
senses,  as  In  the  case  of  a  three-dimensional  object  or 
other  works  In  a  humanly  perceivable  form,  It  may  be 
studied,  and  the  Ideas  and  principles  derived  from  that 
study  may  be  used  to  create  a  simi Jar  or  Identical 
functional lty,  prov~dlng  that  the  expression  of  the 
copyrighted  worK  IS  not  reproduced. 
3.5.3.  A  special  except~p~ to  the  normal  rules  of  copyright  and 
whIch  Is  of  reI evi:rnce ., n  the te I ecommun I catIons  standards 
area  has  been  Introduced  1  n  DIrect 1  ve  91/250  EC  on  the 
legal  protection  of  computer  programs  to  enable 
Interoperable  programs  to  be  created  by  means  of  deriving 
and  re-usIng  I nf_orma t  1  on  from  ex 1st 1  ng  programs.  A  study 
of  a  computer  program  In  mach I ne-readab I e  form  may  not 
yield  alI  the  Information  required  In  order  to  create  an 
Interoperable  program. - 13  -
Acts  which  would  constitute  technical  violations  of 
copyright  rights  such  as  reproducing  or  translating  the 
program  may  need  to  be  carried  out.  The  Directive  does 
not  exclude  the  posslbl 1 lty  that  payment  may  be  made  to 
the  rlghtholder  for  such  Information  as  a  consequence  of 
negotiation  between  the  rlghtholder  and  the  person 
requiring  Information.  The  exception  does  not  allow  for 
the copying  of  protectable expression. 
3.5.4.  As  regards  the  specification  for  a  standard  which  Is 
produced  In  text  form,  copyright  rules  wl  I I  apply  to  the 
express I on  of  the  specIficatIon.  ThIs  does  not  prevent 
users  of  the  specification  from  lnplementlng  the 
spec If lcat I on.  No  part  of  the  product  or  process  which 
Is  subject  to  Intellectual  property  rights  should  be 
described  1  n  the  spec 1  f I cat 1  on,  un I ess  the  r I ghtho I der 
has  agreed  to  the  use  of  his  Intellectual  property  rights 
In  that  standard. 
3. 5. 5.  Once  authorIzatIon  has  been  gIven  by  the  owner  of  an 
I nte I I ectua I  property  rIght  for  the  product  or  process 
covered  by  the  right  to  be  used  as  the  basis  of  a 
standard,  authorIzatIon  to  descrIbe  the  standard  In  a 
technical  specification must  also  have  been  given,  either 
expl lcltly or  lmpl lcltly. 
3.5.6.  Ownership  of  the  copyright,  If  any,  In  the  written  form 
of  the  specIfIcatIon  w I I I  depend  on  whether  the 
specification  has  been  provided  by  the owner  of  rights  In 
a  de  facto  standard,  or  has  been  provided  by  a  standards 
body  following  agreement  between  the  parties concerned  as 
to  the ownership  of  the  authors'  rights  In  the  text. 
3.5.7.  If  the  specification  of  the  standard  Is  drawn  up  with 
sufficient  accuracy,  It  should  contain  alI  the 
Information  necessary  to  ensure  a  satisfactory 
Implementation  of  the  standard.  It  should  not  therefore 
norma I I y  be  necessary  to  I ook  beyond  the  specIfIcatIon 
for  add It I ona I  1  nformat 1  on  un I ess  thIs  can  be  done 
without  violating  the  Intellectual  property  rights  In  the 
product  or  process  so described. - 14  -
4.0.  THE  STANDARD-MAKING  PROCESS 
4.1.  STANDARDS  INCORPORATING  NO  PROTECTED  MATERIAL 
4.1.1.  It  Is  the  case  In  most  standardization  work  that  either 
no  Intellectual  property  rights exist or  are created,  or 
that  there  Is  express  consent  to  free  use  of  the 
Intellectual  property  or  waiver  of  any  rights  arising  or 
acquired.  It  Is  also  possible  that  Intellectual  property 
rights  arise  but  are  owned  and  exercised  jointly  by  alI 
members  of  the  grouping,  or  according  to  contractual 
arrangements  between  the  parties. 
4. 1. 2.  In  these  1 nstances  the  quest 1 on  of  the  exIstence, 
ownership  and  exercise of  Intellectual  property  rights  Is 
normal Jy  resolved  ab  Initio,  and  no  f,urther  problems 
should  arise.  It  should  be  stressed  that,  wherever 
possible,  standards  should  be  devised  which  avoid  taking 
over  proprietary  technology  on  which  Intel Jectual 
property  rights  already exist. 
4.2.  'DE  FACTO'  STANDARDS 
4.2.1.  The  opposite  situation  exists  where  the  product  or 
process  developed  by  one  manufacturer  becomes,  by  virtue 
of  Its  success  on  the market,  the  de  facto  standard.  For 
example,  In  the  video  cassette/recorder  field,  the 
overwhe I  m I ng  success  of  the  VHS 
11 standard 
11  Is  a  we I 1-
known  case.  In  these  situations  the  products  or  process 
will  almost  certainly  embody  Intellectual  property 
rights. 
4.2.2.  These  rights  may  have  been  known  to  others  In  the 
Industry  If  patents  are  Involved  since  patent 
app I I catIons  are  a  matter  of  pub I I c  record  once  the  18 
months  period  from  first  filing  date  Is  up,  at  least  as 
far  as  the  CommunIty  Is  concerned,  and  It  Is  un I Ike I y 
that  a  de  facto  standardIzatIon  can  have  occurred  1  n  a 
period  less  than  18  months. 
The  manufacturer  may  even  have  cone I uded  I 1 cences  w 1 th 
third  parties  In  respect  of  those  rights  to  permit 
manufacture  In  certain markets. 
4.2.3.  If  copyright  Is  Involved  the situation  Is  more  ambiguous, 
as  far  as  those  countries  are  concerned  which  Impose  no 
registration  formalities  on  the  copyright  holder,  as  Is 
the  case  In  alI  the  Member  States.  In  these 
circumstances  copyright  may  exist  and  expire  at  the  end 
of  Its  due  term  without  Its val ldlty ever  being  tested. - 15  -
4.2.4.  Nevertheless  It  should  always  be  possf·ble  for  the 
potent I a I  owner  of  a  copyrIght  to  IdentIfy  the  subject 
.matter  over  which  he  Intends  to  claim  a  prior  rJ.ght.  A 
presumption  of  ownership  will  thus  be  createa  which  will 
be  rebuttable  If  he  Is  found  not  to  be  the  owner  or  If 
the  subject matter  Is  held  not  to  be  protectable. 
4.2.5.  If  the  owner  of  the  Intellectual  property  right  Is  made 
aware  that  a  standard~maklng  body  wlsh~s  to  base  a 
standard  on  hIs  techno I ogy,  he  Is  put  on  notIce  that  a 
violation  of  his  Intellectual  property  rights  might 
occur. 
4.2.6.  It  Is  therefore  of  reI evance  to  any  subsequent 
negotiations or  I ltlgatlon  to establIsh  by  what  means  the 
rlghtholder  could  b·e  expected  to  know  that  a  violation of 
his  rights might  be  proposed. 
In  the  ev.ent  that  the 
the  standard  making 
receives  constructive 
standard  Is  due  to  be 
quest I on.  In  other 
standards  body  must 
rlghtholder  has  been 
use  of  his  rights. 
rlghtholder  participates  himself  In 
body  It  may  be  assumed  that  he 
notice  by  the  announcement  that  a 
establ lshed  using  the  technology  In 
words,  an  announcement  by  the 
create  a  presumption  that  the 
put  on  notIce  as  to  the  potent I a I 
4.2.7.  However  where  the  de  facto  standard  concerns  a  technology 
created  by  a  manufacturer  not  belonging  to  the  standards 
body,  the manufacturer  cannot  be  said  to  be  presumptively 
put  on  notIce.  ThIs  sItuatIon  w I I I  be  dea It  wIth  In 
paragraph  4.6  below. 
4.2.8.  Adoption  of  official  standards  based  on  de  facto  standard 
solutions  has  many  advantages.  De  facto  standards  are  by 
their  nature  wei 1-trled  and  tested  solutions,  stable  and 
technically  satisfactory.  They  have  market  acceptance 
and  are  probably  wei !-documented. 
4.2.9.  Therefore  In  spIte  of  the  difficulties  which  the 
existence  of  proprietary  Intellectual  property  rights 
could  potentially create,  It  Is  unavoidable  that  de  facto 
standards  w I I I  present  themse I ves  In  many  Instances  as 
natural  candidates  for  adaptation  Into  recognized 
standards. 
No  cases  have  been  drawn  to  the  attention  of  the 
Commission  as  yet  where  the  owner  of  Intellectual 
property  rIghts  In  a  ·techno I ogy  refused  to  I I cence  hIs 
rights  to  enable  an  already  agreed  standard  to  be 
subsequently  Implemented. - 16  -
4.2.10.  Particular  attention  has  to  be  paid  however  to  the 
procedures  by  which  this  process  occurs  In  order  to 
ensure  that  the  Interests  of  rlghtholders  and  standards 
users  are  respected.  These  procedures  are  dea It  wIth  In 
the  following  sections. 
4.3.  STANDARDS  CREATED  TO  INCLUDE  AN  IPR 
REFUSAL  TO  LICENCE. 
AGREEMENT  AND 
4. 3. 1.  1  f  there  are  propr 1  etary  1 nte  1 1  ectua 1  property  rIghts 
under 1  y 1  ng  the  techno I ogy  on  wh 1  ch  a  standard  Is  to  be 
based  and  that  fact  Is  known  to  the  standard makers,  then 
the  agreement  of  the  r I ghtho I der  must  be  sought  If  the 
work  on  the  standard  Is  to  continue.  It  Is  obvious  that 
such  an  agreement  should  be  sought  at  the  earl lest 
poss I b I e  opportunIty  so  that,  In  the  event  of  a  refusa I 
to  licence,  alternative  solutions  may  be  explored.  A 
tlme-1 lmlt  within  which  permission  must  be  given  or 
refused  can  a I so  assIst  In  speedIng  up  the  standard-
making  process. 
4. 3. 2.  Once  the  I I  mIt  has  passed  and  no  agreement  has  been 
reached  between  the  parties  as  to  the  use  of  an 
I nte I I ectua I  property  r I ght,  work  on  that  so I utI on  must 
be  ha I ted  and  an  a Iter natIve  techno I ogy  cons I de  red.  It 
would  be  Inadvisable  for  a  standard-making  body  to 
contInue  work  on  a  standard  If  permIssIon  has  not  been 
sought  or  has  not  been  granted  In  respect  of  Intellectual 
property  rights. 
4.3.3.  If  agreement  Is  reached  between  the  rlghtholder  and  the 
standard-making  body,  the  terms  for  I lcences  must  be 
faIr,  reasonab I e  and  non-d I scr lm I natory.  1  t  Is  not 
feasible  or  appropriate  to  be  more  specific  as  to  what 
constitutes  ~fairness"  or  "reasonableness"  since  these 
are  subJectIve  factors  determIned  by  the  circumstances 
surrounding  the  negotiation.  If  the  rlghtholder  Is  to  be 
satisfied that  his  Investment  In  research  and  development 
can  be  adequately  recovered,  he  would  expect  the  royalty 
rate  to  relate  In  some  way  to  the  normal  freely-
negotiated  commercial  rate,  allowing  for  the  greatly 
Increased  market  for  his  technology  which  standardization 
w I I I  brIng. 
4.3.4.  The  terms  which  the  rlghtholder  offers  for  the  use of  his 
rights  should  be  flexible  enough  to  Include  the 
poss I b I I I ty,  If  the  partIes  so  agree,  of  cross- I I cens I ng 
arrangements.  Cases  of  disputes  arising  In  relation  to 
the  terms  and  conditions offered  by  the  rlghtholder  could 
be  resolved  If  necessary  by  arbitration. - 17  -
In  the  event  of  an  appeal  against  an  arbitration  decision 
both  parties  may  have  recourse  to  the  use  of  Article  86 
EC. 
4.3.5.  The  freedom  of  the  rlghtholder  to  refuse  to  I lcence  Is, 
at  the  present  time,  absolute,  since  his  exclusive 
Intellectual  property  r lghts  cannot  be  subject  to 
expropriation  or  compulsory  I icenslng  except  In 
exceptional  circumstances  such  as  reasons  of  national 
security or  over-riding  publ lc  Interest. 
4.3.6.  However  a  refusal  to  licence  by  the  rightholder  Implies 
as  a  consequence  that  an  alternative  technical  solution 
w 1 I 1  probab 1  y  be  adopted  and  w I I I  then  cha I I enge  the 
rlghtholder's  potential  or  de  facto  dominance  In  the 
market.  1  t  1  s  norma 1 I y  therefore  not  In  the 
r 1  ghtho 1  der · s  Interest  to  dec I I ne  to  I I cence  hIs  patent 
or  his  copyright  unless  the  terms  offered  by  the 
potential  users  fal I  wei I  short  of  his  commercial 
expectations. 
4.3.7.  This  factor  has  to  be  borne  In  mind  In  relationship  to 
the  "fairness"  or  "reasonableness"  of  the  remuneration 
which  the  rlghtholder  seeks  to  obtain  and  balanced 
against  the  enhanced  market  opportunities  which 
standardization  on  his  technology  might  bring. 
4.4.  LATE  OR  NON-DISCLOSURE  OF  RIGHTS 
4.4.1.  A  potential  source  of  difficulties  can  be  Identified 
where  proprietary  rights  are  not  disclosed  at  alI  or  are 
dIsc I osed  I ate  1  n  the  standard-makIng  process.  In 
theory,  an  I PR  hoI der  (havIng  been  put  on  notIce  by  a 
standard-making  body  that  his  rights  were  potentially  to 
be  used  In  the  creatIon  of  a  standard,)  wou I d  be  actIng 
In  bad  faith  If  he  claimed  those  rights  only  once  the 
standard  had  been  adopted,  thereby  forcing  competitors  to 
agree  to  I lcence  royalties  higher  than  those  which  might 
have  been  offered  at  an  ear 1 1  er  stage,  or  b I ock I ng  the 
Implementation  of  the  standard  completely. 
4.4.2.  As  has  been  Indicated  In  paragraph  4.2.9.  above,  no  such 
event  has  yet  been  notified  to  the  Commission.  However, 
bad  fa 1  th  cou 1  d  eas 1 1  y  be  demonstrated  where  a 
presumption  of  knowledge  on  the  part  of  the  rlghtholder 
can  be  establ lshed. - 18  -
It  is  therefore  for  standards-making  bodies  to  establIsh 
procedures  whereby  I ate  dIsc I osure  or  non-dIsc I osure  of 
rights  Is  penal lzed  once  actual  or  presumed  knowledge  can 
be  establ lshed.  The  degree  to  which  late  disclosure 
Inconveniences  the  standard-making  body  can  be  regulated 
by  means  of  the  time-limit  Imposed  on  rlghtholders  to 
declare  an  Interest  once  a  standard  has  been  announced. 
4.4.3.  If  there  are deliberate acts  of  bad  faith  on  the  part  of 
the  rlghtholder  a  court  might  take  these  Into 
consideration  In  evaluating  the extent  of  any  damages  for 
copyr lght  or  patent  violation  under  civil  or  criminal 
law. 
4.5.  LIABILITY  FOR  NON-DISCLOSURE 
4.5.1.  The  question  arises  as  to  the  extent  to  which  the 
rlghtholder  can  and  should  be  held  I lable  for  a  fal lure 
to  disclose  an  Interest.  If  publication  of  future 
standard-makIng  actIvItIes  takes  pI ace  In  an  effIcIent 
manner,  the  responsab I I I ty  for  conductIng  a  search  of 
patents  and  copyrights  held  by  a  manufacturer  taking  part 
In  the  standard-making  process  must  rest  with  that 
manufacturer.  The  rlghtholder  may  be  unaware  of  the  fact 
that  he  Is  In  possession  of  a  patent  In  a  given  area,  or 
that  the subject matter  In  question might  be  covered  by  a 
copyrIght.  The  task  of  IdentIfyIng  reI evant  rIghts  w I I I 
of  course  be  more  onerous  for  manufacturers  with 
substantial  IPR  portfol los  and  this  factor  should  be 
taken  Into  consideration  by  the  standard-making  body, 
perhaps  by  allocating  a  longer  tlme-1 lmlt  for  the 
I dent If I cat I on  of  rIghts  by  manufacturers  who  can 
demonstrate  the  magnitude  of  the  search  procedure  to  be 
carried out  In  their  particular case. 
4. 5. 2.  If  on  the  other  hand,  the  standard-makIng  body  accepts 
the  responsab I I I ty  for  conduct 1  ng  a  search  of  poss 1  b I e 
patents  In  a  gIven  area,  then  the  I I ab 1 I I ty  for 
disclosure  must  no  longer  rest  with  the  Individual 
r I ghtho I der,  a I one.  He  can  no  I onger  be  automat I ca I I y 
presumed  to  have  acted  In  bad  faith  by  fal 1 lng  to 
disclose his  rights. - 19  -
4.6.  IDENTIFICATION  OF  RIGHT  HOLDERS 
4. 6. 1.  1 f  a  standard-making  body  bases  Its  work  on  a  techn I ca I 
solution  which  Is  not  the  property  of  any  of  those 
participating  In  Its  work,  and  makes  no  effort  to 
Identify  and  obtain  authorization  from  the  proprietary 
rights  holder,  then  the  normal  appl lcatlon  of 
Intellectual  property  law  lmpl les  that  an  Infringement  of 
rights  has  occurred  If  no  reasonable effort  has  been  made 
to  trace  the  rlghtholder.  Seeking  authorization  ex  post 
facto  wi  II  not  legitimize  the  Infringement  of  rights. 
Therefore  the  standard-making  body  has  to ensure  that  alI 
reasonable  efforts  have  been  made  to  Identify  rights  and 
to  negotiate  with  the  rlghtholder  before  the  subject 
matter  of  the  rIghts  Is  Incorporated  Into  the  standard 
even  If  thIs  means  that  searches  have  to  be  carr led  out 
as  to  the  existence of  patents. 
4. 6. 2.  Outs 1 de  the  standard-makIng  envIronment,  a  manufacturer 
wishing  to  launch  a  new  product  should  ensure  that  In  so 
doing  he  wl  I I  not  violate existing  patents or  copyrights. 
The  standard  making  body  has  a  duty  to  take  alI 
reasonable  precautions  to  the  same  end. 
4.7.  AVAILABILITY  OF  LICENCES 
4.7.1.  A  further  question  which  standard-making  bodies  must 
address  Is  the  extent  to  which  proprietary  rights  should 
be  I lcensed  for  use.  The  normal  practice  Is  for  standard-
makIng  bodIes  to  make  standards  ava I I ab I e  to  a I I  users 
regard I ess  of  whether  they  take  part  1 n  the  standard-
making  process.  Terms  and  conditions  appl led  to 
participants  and  non-participants  should  not 
significantly discriminate against  the  latter.  A  fortiori 
where  the  standard-mak 1 ng  body  acts  In  an  offIcI  a I  or 
quasi-official  standard-making  capacity  and  where  Its 
standards  are  recognIzed  and  even  made  compu I sory  by 
vIrtue  of  I eg 1 s I at I on,  access  to  the  standard  must  be 
aval fable  to alI  without  a  pre-condition  of  membership  of 
any  organization.  Similarly,  any  treatment  of  non-members 
whIch  wou I d  Impose  f I nanc I a I  or  other  burdens  on  them 
which  act  as  a  direct  Incentive  to  become  a  member  of  a 
standard-making  organization  should  be  avoided.  Different 
condItIons  mIght  be  app I I ed  to  dIfferent  users  In 
reI at I on  to  theIr  contr 1 but Ions  to  the  standard-mak 1 ng 
process  and  the  benefits  and  disadvantages  which  the 
parties  can  demonstrate  with  regard  to  their  particular 
circumstances. 
4.7.2.  The  rlghtholder  must  in  all  cases  retain  the  Initial 
right  to  grant  or  refuse  I lcences  on  whatever  exclusivity 
or  territorial  basis  he  wishes,  subject  to  the 
appl lcatlon  of  Articles 30- 36,  59,  66  and  85,  86  of  the 
Treaty. - 20  -
If membership  of  an  industrial  grouping  or  of  a  standard-
making  body  Is  conditional  upon  agreement  to  a 
recIprocIty  arrangement  between  members  and  non-mernbers 
It  Is  for  the  rlghtholder  to  decide  whether  those 
arrangements  are  acceptab I e  to  hIm  before  joInIng  the 
grouping  or  standards  body. 
4.7.3.  It  should  be  borne  In  mind  by  Industry  groupings  and 
standards  bodIes  that  I nte  I I ectua I  property  rIghts  are 
exclusive  rights  which  are  usually  exercised 
territorially.  A  rlghtholder  can  choose  whom  he  licences 
to  reproduce,  pub 1 1  sh,  manufacture  or  d I str  1  bute  copIes 
of  hIs  work  and  may  grant  exc I us I ve  I I cences  for  one 
specific market,  the  Member  States  of  the  Community  being 
understood,  of  course,  for  such  purposes  as  one  sIng I e 
market.  The  Community  has  taken,  within  the  GATT  Uruguay 
Round  negotiations,  a  strong  I lne  against  the 
International  exhaustion  of  Intellectual  property  rights. 
It  has  to  be  recognized  at  the  same  time  that  the 
standard-making  process  ental Is  an  acceptance  by  the 
rlghtholder  of  the  fact  that  he  Is  no  longer  acting  In  a 
totally  free  and  geographically  limited  market  once  he 
has  agreed  to  gIve  I I cences  as  of  rIght  on  faIr  and 
reasonab I e  condItIons  to  a I 1  users  of  a  standard.  The 
International  obligations  of  the  Community  In  this 
respect  are  dealt  with  In  section  5.0  below. 
4.8.  INDUSTRY  SPECIFIC  SOLUTIONS 
4.8.1.  It may  be  the  case  that  In  certain  Industries  the  use  of 
techn I ca I  standards  Is  more  deve I oped  than  In  others. 
The  reasons  may  be  historic,  for  example  the  Initial 
overwhelmIng  success  wor I dw I de  of  a  part I cuI ar  product, 
makIng  It  attractIve  for  other  manufacturers  to  adopt 
similar  solutions.  The  reasons  may  also  be  purely 
techn I ca I,  for  examp I e  the  need  to  ensure  compat I b I I I ty 
of  International  air traffic control  and  landing  guidance 
systems.  They  may  also  be  commercial,  for  example 
pressure  from  consumers  for  h 1-f  I  products  of  d 1 f ferent 
manufacturers  to  be  combined  Into  "sound  systems". 
4.8.2.  As  a  general  rule,  the  more  mature  a  market,  the  greater 
the  I Ike  I I hood  that  non-proprIetary  standard  so I utI  ons 
w I I I  be  adopted,  at  I east  as  far  as  Inter  faces  between 
products  of  dIfferent  manufacturers  are  concerned. 
Mature  markets  may  lead  to  a  corresponding  decrease  In 
the  market  dominance  of  the  de  facto  standard  since  the 
ear I y  market  I ead  of  a  sIng I e  manufactvrer  may  we 1 1  be 
over taken  by  competItors  of fer 1  ng  s 1m 1 I ar  but  1  mproved 
product  ranges. - 21  -
1 t  1 s  a 1 so  often  the  case  that  manufacturers  of 
establ lshed  product  types  prefer  to  concentrate  on 
Improvements  to  qual tty  or  refinements  of  style  or 
performance,  leaving  the  standardized  aspects  of  the 
product  unchanged. 
4.8.3.  The  so-called  'black  box'  standardization  described  In 
2.1 .2.  above,  (which  Is  I lmlted  to ensuring  compatlbl I lty 
at  the  points  of  connection)  and  which  can  be  observed 
for  example  In  the case of  consumer  electronics,  has  many 
benefIts  to  consumers  and  manufacturers.  It~  mu It I pI I es 
choices  aval lable  on  the  market  but  makes  few  demands  on 
the  I nte I I ectua I  property  rIghts  of  these  manufacturers 
already  occupying  a  place  In  the market. 
4.8.4.  In  the  other  areas  of  standardization,  the  process  Is 
driven  not  by  reasons  of  lnteroperabl I lty  or  market 
acceptance,  but  by  reasons  of  qua I I ty,  safety  or 
con form I ty  to  certaIn  techn I ca I  norms.  In  these 
Instances  a  result  to  be  achieved  has  to  be  determined, 
but  a  variety  of  technical  means  to  achieve  that  result 
may  stl I I  be  aval lable. 
4.8.5.  Intellectual  property  rights  may  therefore  be  less  In 
confl let  with  the  objectives  of  standardization  In  these 
circumstances  ,  since  the  standard  Is  I lkely  to  be  based 
on  results  rather  than  methods.  As  a  general  principle, 
and  for  the  reasons  set  out  above,  standardization  based 
on  results  to  be  achieved  rather  than  on  a  specific 
design  or  process  technology,  Is  to  be  preferred. 
4.8.6.  In  the  telecommunications  area  an  argument  has  been  made 
by  some  that  the  advances  In  technology  are  so  rapid  and 
the  degree  of  Involvement  of  Intellectual  property  rights 
so  great  that  existing  ISO/IEC  rules  are  Inadequate. 
This  Is  felt  to  be  especially  the  case  In 
telecommunications  where  exact  specifications  must  be 
respected  If  publ lc  networks  are  to  function  In  an 
interoperable and  efficient manner. 
4.8.7.  It  Is  not  possible  to  say  that  In  any  specific  l1'1dustry, 
be  It  pressure vessels,  mechanical  engineering,  aerospace 
engIneerIng,  or  te I ecommun I catIons,  standardIzation  and 
I nte I I ectua I  property  rIghts  co-exIst  wIth  greater  or 
lesser  difficulty.  Examples  may  be  found,  within  one  and 
the  same  Industry,  of  standardization  carried  out  for  a 
variety  of  historic,  technical,  commercial  and  safety 
reasons.  As  a  market  for  a  particular  product  or  process 
evo I ves,  the  motIves  whIch  I ead  to  standardIzatIon  may 
also  evolve. - 22  -
4.8.8.  The  Importance  of  the  role  of  governments  in  determining 
the  precise  rules  which  affect  the  running  of  standards-
making  bodies  should  be  noted.  Governments  have  a 
number  of  roles  to  play  In  this area  In  that  they  are  the 
procuring  entity  and  the  user  of  standards,  the  authority 
responsible  for  setting  the  boundaries  for  standard-
making  activities  and  at  the.  same  time  encouraging 
research  and  development  In  both  the  private  and  public 
sectors,  and  the  regulator  of  competition  policy. 
Therefore  the  Involvement  of  the  legislator  In  the 
standard-making  process  and  In  the mandating  of  standards 
In  specific areas  becomes  a  tool  of  Industry  pol Icy. 
4.8.9.  If  a  standard  to  which  reference  Is  made  In  a  legally 
binding  Instrument,  such  as  a  Community  Directive,  Is  not 
specific but  Is  rather  a  general  reference  to  unspecified 
standards  In  a  given  field  such  as  those  referred  to  In 
Article  13  of  Directive  90/531/EEc<S>,  then  questions 
may  arise  as  to  the  role  of  the  private  standard  making 
bodies.  If  this  Is  the  case,  a  fortiori,  It  strengthens 
the  need  for  uniform  rules  to  apply  to  standard-making  l.n 
those  areas  where  legally  binding  Instruments  are  I lkely 
to  make  reference  to  such  standards or  In  areas where  the 
use  of  certain  standards  made  by  such  quasi- private  or 
private bodies  wl  I I  be  mandatory. 
4.8.10.  It  also  re-Inforces  the  underlying  principle  that  the 
r I ghtho I der  must  remaIn,  at  a I I  stages  of  the  process, 
free  to  contract  with  the  user  of  his  Intellectual 
property  rights,  since  a  standard-making  body  which 
assumed  the  role  of  administrator  of  such  rights  on 
behalf  of  Its  membership  In  an  area  where  use  of 
standards  became  mandatory  through  I egIs I at I ve  act I on, 
would  de  facto  acquire  a  monopoly  power  In  relation  to 
those  manufacturers  and  users  who  remaIned  outs I de  the 
standard-making  body. 
4.8.11.  In  the  view  of  the  Commission,  no  particular  Industries 
should  be  singled  out  as  requiring  specific  solutions. 
Such  a  pol Icy,  even  If  effective  In  the  short  term,  could 
not  guarantee  an  approprIate  so I ut 1 on  In  the  'nng  term 
when  the  Imperatives  which  drive  the  moves  towards 
standardization  In  that  particular  Industry  ~ay  have 
changed. 
(6)  Article  13  (2)  :  The  technical  specifications  shall  be 
defined  by  reference  to  European  specifications  where 
these exist. 
Article  13  (3)  In  the  absence  of  European 
specifications,  the  technical  specifications  should  as 
far  as  possible  be  defined  by  references  to  other 
standards  having  currency within  the  Community. - 23  -
4.8.12.  If  special  rules  for  the  co-existence  of  Intellectual 
property  rights  and  standardization  were  developed  on  an 
Industry  specific  basis,  any  resulting  lessening  of 
I nte I I ectua I  property  rIghts  cou I d  I ead  to  a  shIft  In 
production  by  manufacturers  away  from  that  Industry,  and 
could  disadvantage,  rather  than  stimulate,  European 
production. - 24  -
5.0.  OTHER  POLICY  CONSIDERATIONS 
5.1.  COMPETITION 
5.1.1.  An  Important  consideration  In  the  successful  management 
of  standardization  Involving  Intellectual  property  rights 
must  also  be  the  appl !cation  of  the  competition  rules  of 
the  Treaty  and  specifically  the  application  of  Articles 
85  and  86.  The  Issues  which  arise may  be  divided  Into  two 
categories  those  which  relate  to  the  constitution  and 
operatIon  of  the  standard-makIng  body  under  Art I c I e  86 
and  those  which  relate  to  a  refusal  to  grant  I lcences  to 
use  an  I PR  or  to  the  of fer  of  terms  and  condItIons  for 
such  I lcences  under  Article 86. 
5.1.2.  Standards-making  bodies  must  be  mindful  of  the 
requIrements  of  Art I c I e  85  regardIng  In  part I cu le.r  the 
fIx 1 ng  of  roya I ty  rates  or  other  tradIng  condItIons  In 
respect  of  standards  which  they  make  aval table,  and, 
add It I ona I I y  must  avoId  creatIng  opportunItIes  for 
exchange  of  competitively  sensitive  Information  or  for 
restrictive  practices  relating  to  quantities,  prices, 
customer  and  territory sharing. 
5.1.3.  Restrictive  agreements  falling  under  Article  85(1)  may 
nevertheless  be  exempted  by  the  Commission  under  Article 
85(3)  where  their  benefits  significantly  outweigh  the 
antlcompetltlve  detriments.  Standard-making  bodies  may 
therefore  seek  to  notIfy  the  CommIssIon  of  agreements 
which  fal I  within  the  ambit  of  Article  85  with  a  view  to 
negative  clearance  or  an  Individual  exemption  under 
Article  85(3).  Benefits  derived  from  an  exempted 
agreement  must  not  fa I I  on I y  on  the  partIes  themse I ves 
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5. 1. 6.  Abuse  of  a  domInant  posIt 1  on  by  a  standard-makIng  body 
and  Its  members  could  manifest  itself  by  the  activities 
of  Imposing  unfair  purchasing  prices  (I.e.  royalty  rates 
to  rlghtholders)  or  set I lng  prices,  (rates  Including 
royalties  for  the  use  of  standards)  or  other  unfair 
trading  conditions.  Paragraphs  (b)(c)  and  (d)  of  Article 
86  mIght  a I so  cover  abuse  of  a  domInant  posIt I on  by  a 
standard-making  body. 
5 . 1 . 7 .  The  same  test  w i I I  a p p I y  to  t he  I n d I v I d u a I  under t a k I n g , 
owner  of  an  i nte I I ectua I  property  rIght  whIch  the 
standard-makIng  body  wIshes  to  use  as  the  bas Is  for  a 
standard.  However,  whereas  the  definition  of  product 
market  and  the establishment  of  dominance  In  the  relevant 
market  are  factors  on  which  a  considerable  jurisprudence 
now  exists  at  Community  level,  there  have  been  as  yet  no 
decision  of  the  appl !cation  of  Article  86  In  the 
standards  field. 
The  fIndIng  of  domInance  depends  heav I I y  on  the 
definition  of  the  relevant  product  market.  Obviously, 
the  narrower  the  reI evant  product  market  Is  the  greater 
the  I ikel ihood  of  dominance  being  established.  The 
concept  of  the  relevant  product  market  impl les  that  there 
can  be  effective  competition  between  the  products  which 
form  part  of  It  and  th 1 s  presupposes  that  there  Is  a 
suffIcIent  degree  of  I nterchangeab I I I ty  between  a I I 
products  formIng  part  of  the  same  market  In  so  far  as 
specific  use  of  such  products  Is  concerned.  This  must  be 
assessed  Inter  a I I a  In  the  1 I ght  of  the  structure  of 
demand  and  supply  for  each  product  and  can  lead  to 
holding  an  undertaking  dominant  In  the market  for  Its  own 
products.(8) 
5. 1 . 8.  The  quest I on  Is  the  extent  to  whIch  a  ref  usa I  by  a 
rlghtholder  to  allow  his  technology  to  become  the  basis 
for  a  standard  wou I d  be  ant I competItIve.  In  order  to 
demonstrate  abuse  of  a  dominant  position  It  would  be 
necessary  to  establIsh  that  the  relevant  market  was  the 
technological  solution  In  question  and  that  the  owner  of 
rights  in  that  technology  occupied  a  position  of 
dominance  In  relation  to  that market. 
(8)  Hugln/Commlsslon  Judgment  of  31  May  1979  In  Case  22/78 
(1979)  ECR  1869;  BBC/Commlsslon  (Magi 1 I)  Judgment  of  10 
July  1991  in  Case  T-70/89  of  the  Court  of  First 
Instance;  HI  lti/Commlsslon  Judgment  of  12  December  1991 
in  Case  T-30/89  of  the Court  of  First  Instance. 5. 1. 9 
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1  f  the  criterIa  for  estab I ish I ng  reI evant  market 
dominance  were  met  the  next  step would  be  to evaluate 
behav 1  our  of  the  r I ghtho I der  In  refusIng  to  a I I ow 




5.1 .10.  Unt I I  now,  the  Court 
that  a  mere  refusal 
1  nstances  of  abusIve 
under  Article 86(9). 
of  JustIce  has 
to  I i cence  an 
behaviour,  will 
a I ways  maIntaIned 
IPR,  absent  other 
not  be  act I onab I e 
1 nte 1 1  ectua I  property  rIghts  are  by  theIr  nature 
exclusive  property  rights,  and  except  In  very  I lmlted  and 
specific  circumstances,  as  laid  down  In  national 
legislation  or  International  conventions,  do  not  have  to 
be  made  aval !able  to  others  by  means  of  compulsory 
1 lcences  unless  It  can  be  demonstrated  that  the  exercise 
of  the  right  Involves certain  abusive conduct. 
5. 1. 11.  Therefore  Art I  c I e  86  cannot  permIt  the  expropr I at I or.  of 
rIghts  for  the  purposes  of  usIng  the  techno I ogy  as  the 
basis  of  a  standard  where  no  other  circumstances 
establIsh  abuse  of  a  dominant  position,  and  taking  Into 
account  particularly  whether  there  are  other  viable 
technologies  aval lable. 
The  problem  should  therefore  be  addressed  before  the 
technology  on  which  to  base  the  standard  has  been 
defInItIve I y  se I ected.  If  the  standard  In  quest I on  had 
been  adopted,  Implemented,  and  made  mandatory  by  a 
CommunIty  Instrument,  ref  usa I  to  I I cence  the  techno I ogy 
necessary  to  use  the  standard  would,  a  fortiori,  create 
difficulties. 
5.1.12.  A main  obJective of  Article  86  Is  to ensure  that  dominant 
companIes  do  not  create  condItIons  of  tradIng  In  whIch 
they  are able  to stifle or  el lmlnate competition. 
If  no  standard  exists,  the  IPR  holder  cannot  be  dominant 
In  respect  of  Ute  standard.  If  compet 1  t  I on  exIsts  on  the 
market  for  the  product  whose  techno I ogy  the  standard-
makers  seek  to  use,  the  standard-maker  Is  mere I y 
prevented  from  exercIsIng  a  part I cuI ar·  choIce  as  regards 
the  solution  which  he  wishes  to  adopt  to  a  specific 
problem. 
( 9)  Vo I vo:  Veng  [ 1988]  ECR  Ground  8 - 27  -
5. 1. 13.  The  sItuatIon  where  the  standard-maker  Is  not  ab I e  to 
choose  an  a I ternat I ve  techno I ogy  must  be  exam I ned.  The 
circumstances  In  which  this  Is  the  case  wl  I I  be  unusual. 
Nevertheless,  for  technical  or  for  financial  reasons  the 
standard-maker  could  attempt  to  demonstrate  the  absolute 
necessIty  of  I i cences  beIng  ava I I ab I e  for  the  use  of  a 
particular  technology.  It  could  also  be  cl~lmed  that 
alternative  technologies  produced  Inferior  results.  In 
the  case  of  technical  necessity,  objective  evaluation  of 
the  scope  of  the  patent  In  question  should  reveal  whether 
the  patent  Is  so  broad  as  to  render  alI  other  substitute 
technologies  not  viable.  It  Is  relatively  rare  for  a 
patent  to  cover  such  a  broad  Innovative  area  that 
a I terna  t  I ve  means  to  achIeve  the  same  resu It  cannot  be 
found. 
5.1.14.  As  to  financial· necessity,  excessive  pricing  of  Its 
technology  by  the  dominant  company  could  be  Indicative 
of  abusive  behaviour  but  this  factor  Is  not  of  relevance 
In  a  case  of  mere  ref  usa I  to  I I cence.  It  shou I d  be  noted 
however  that  excessIve  prIces  asked  for  by  a  domInant 
company  could  amount  to  a  de  facto  refusal  to  I lcense. 
5. 1. 15.  If  It  were  demonstrab I e  that  no  other  vI ab I e  techno I ogy 
existed,  It  would  fall  to  be  resolved  whether  the 
standard-making  body,  or  potential  users  of  the  standard, 
would  be  placed  at  a  competitive  disadvantage  vis-a-vis 
the  owner  of  the  Intellectual  property  right  by  the  fact 
that  no  standard  could  be  made  In  that  area,  or  that  the 
standard  adopted  was  less  efficient  than  the  proprietary 
technology.  Although  It  could  be  argued  that  consumers 
would  benefit  In  the  short  term  If  Intellectual  property 
rights  were  compulsively  1 lcensed  to  serve  as  the  basis 
of  standards,  In  the  I ong-term,  Investment  In  research 
and  deve I opment  In  the  standard 1 zed  IndustrIa I  sectors 
would  dry  up  within  the Community.  Non-Community  entitles 
with  extensive  research activities would  be  encouraged  to 
keep  theIr  techno I ogy  out  of  CommunIty  markets,  wh I I e 
low-cost  manufacturing  centres  outside  the  Community 
would  benefit  from  cheap  I lcences  to  use  Community 
technology. 
5.1.16.  Therefore,  any  appl lcatlon  of  Article  86  In  the  field  of 
publ lc  standardization  must  be  balanced  against  the 
pol Icy  objective  of  maintaining  the  Community's  strength 
In  research  and  development. 
·------ """  --- ··--::--·-5.2. 
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EXTERNAL  RELATIONS  ASPECTS 
AVA I LAB I L I T Y  OF  L I CENCE S 
COUNTRIES 
FOR  PRODUCTS  FROM  THIRD 
5.2.1.  From  a  pol Icy  point  of  view  the Community  is  committed  to 
the  widest  possible  geographical 
standards  in  the  Interest  of 
enhanced  International  trade. 
ava I I ab I I I ty  and  use  of 
economies  of  scale  and 
5.2.2.  Under  the  Agreement  on  Technical  Barriers  to  Trade  (TBTA) 
concluded  under  the  auspices  of  the  General  Agreement  o~ 
Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT)  In  1979  the  Community  has 
accepted  several  obi lgations  vis  a  vis  the  other  parties 
to  the  TBTA  (practically all  Industrialised countries and 
a  number  of  developing  countries)  In  relation  to  the 
preparation,  adoption  and  application  of  technical 
regulations  and  standards. 
The  level  of  compulsion  varies  according  to  whether  the 
standard  or  technical  regulation  is  prepared,  adopted  or 
appl led  by  a  central  government  body  (Art.  2  TBTA)  or  a 
non-government  body  (Art.  4  TBTA). 
5.2.3.  Under  Art.2  TBTA  the  Community  has  to  ensure  that 
standards  are  not  prepared,  adopted  or  app I I ed  wIth  a 
view  to  creating  obstacles  to  International  trade  and 
that  products  Imported  from  the  territory of  any  party  to 
the  TBTA  shall  be  accorded  treatment  no  less  favourable 
than  that  accorded  to  I Ike  products  of  nat I o11a I  orIgIn 
and  to  I Ike  products  originating  In  any  other  country. 
Under  Art.4  TBTA  the  Community,  as  regards  st4~dards  by 
non-governmental  bodies,  has  to  take  such  ·-asonable 
measures  as  may  be  ava I I ab I e  to  achIeve  the  ut) j ect I ves 
pointed out  In  Art.2  TBTA. 
5.2.4.  Standards  which  are  given  a  mandatory  status  by  Community 
legislation  by  requiring  that  contracting  authorities  In 
publ lc  procurement  Dlrectlves(10)  refer  to  European 
standards  must  be  aval lable  to  entitles  In  the  Community 
at  fair,  reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  terms. 
5. 2. 5.  Standards  which  provide  a  presumptIon  of  conformIty  to 
the  essent I a  I  requIrements  of  CommunIty  ·New  Approach· 
Dlrectlves(11)  must  be  aval fable  to  entitles  In  the 
Community  at  fair, 
terms. 
reasonable  and  non-discriminatory 
(10)  Directives  71/305/EEC  [OJ  N°  L185  16.8.1979,  p.5], 
77/62/EEC  [OJ  N°  L13,  15.1.1977],  90/531/EEC  [OJ  N°L 
297,  29.10.1990,  p.  1] 
(11)  Directives  87/404/EEC  [OJ  N°  L  220,  08.08.1987,p.48], 
88/378/EEC  [OJ  No  L  187,  16.07.1988,  p.1], 
89/1 06/EEC  [OJ  N°  L  40,  11.02. 1989,  p.  12],  89/336/EEC 
[OJ  No  L  139,  23.05.1989,  p.19], 
89/392/EEC  [OJ  No  L  183,  29.06.1989,  p.  29],  89/689/EEC 
[OJ  No  L  399,  30.12.1989,  p.18], 
90/384/EEC  [OJ  N°  L  189,  20.07. 1990,  p. 1],  90/385/EEC 
[OJ  No  L  189,  20.07.1990,  p.  17], 
90/396/EEC  [OJ  No  L  196,  26.07.1990,  p.15],  91/263/EEC 
[OJ  No  L  128,  23.05.1991,  p.1] - 29  -
5.2.6.  For  the  standards  described  in  5.2.4.  and  5.2.5.  above, 
nat 1  on  a 1  treatment  (Art. 2)  requIres  that  products 
originating  in  a  Party  to  the  TBTA  be  treated  In  the  same 
manner.  If  these  standards  contaIn  I nte I I ectua I  property 
rIghts,  thIs  means  that  the  CommunIty  must  ensure  that 
the  Importer  from  a  country  party  to  the  TBTA  can  obtain 
I lcences  from  the  IPR  holder  for  Importation,  marketing, 
sa I e  and  use  In  the  CommunIty  on  faIr,  reasonab I e  and 
non-discriminatory  terms.  For  other  standards  the  level 
of  compulsion  to  reach  this  result  Is  limited  to  the 
adoption  of  reasonable measures. 
From  a  pol Icy  point  of  view  It  would  be  desirable to make 
sure  If  I I cences  for  I PRs  whIch  are  requIred  for 
manufacture  for  export  to  the  Community  are  aval table  on 
faIr,  reasonab I e  and  non-d I scrIm Ina tory  terms  In  order 
not  to create obstacles  to  International  trade. 
5.2.7.  This  Issue  does  not  raise  any  confl let  with  Intellectual 
property  rights  Incorporated  Into  a  standard  provided 
that  the  hoI der  of  such  rIghts  has  consented  to  theIr 
Inclusion.  It  would  become  of  direct  relevance  If  the 
r I ghtho I der  subsequent I y  refused  to  grant  I I cences  for 
the  manufacture  of  products  In  the  CommunIty  or 
Importation  of  products  originating  In  a  TBTA  signatory 
country  or  If  the  existence  of  the  rlghtholder  was  only 
revealed  once  the  standard  had  been  made  mandatory. 
5.2.8.  In  both  the  above  situations,  a  number  of  solutions 
exist.  The  standard  could  be  withdrawn  or  modified. 
Alternatively  In  exceptional  circumstances  the  Community 
Instrument  Itself  might  have  to  be  modified  and  the 
standard  made  non-mandatory.  However,  It  Is  essent I a I 
for  standard-making  bodies  to  recognize  the  need  to 
Identify  any  Intellectual  property  rights  before adopting 
a  technical  solution  and  for  the  rlghtholder  to 
understand  and  accept  the  terms  and  conditions  under 
which  his  rights  wl  I I  subsequently  be  I lcensed,  both  In 
respect  of  manufacturing  and  Importation  I lcences. - 30  -
6.0.  CONCLUSIONS 
6.1.  CODES  OF  PRACTICE  I  GUIDELINES  I  "UNDERTAKINGS" 
6.1.1.  If,  In  spite  of  the  apparent  lack  of  evidence  of 
systematic  difficulties  arising  at  present  in  the 
majority  of  standard-making  bodies,  there  are  concerns 
that  further  codification  of  procedures  for  the 
treatment  of  I nte I lectua I  property  rIghts  In  the 
standards  field  Is  required,  then  consideration  should  be 
given  to  the  nature of  such  codified  procedures. 
6.1 .2.  As  stated  In  paragraph  5.2.5.  above,  the  posslbl I lty  that 
a  European  standard  may  ·be  made  mandatory  or  gIven  a 
particular  status  through  Community  legal  instruments 
pI aces  a  burden  of  responsab I I I ty  on  the  CommunIty  and 
the  standard-mak 1 ng  body  to  ensure  that  democrat lc  and 
pro-competitive  processes  exist  for  the  drafting  of 
standard. 
6.1.3.  Therefore,  the  standard-making  process  should  remain 
voluntary  and  should  respect  existing  national  ·and 
Community  legislation,  and  International  obligations.  If 
changes  to  Community  legislation  or  obi lgations  are 
required  In  order  to  achieve  the  legitimate objectives of 
standardIzatIon,  such  changes  shou I d  be  effected  by  a I I 
relevant  means  Including  proposals  to  the Counci I  by  the 
Commission  for  legislative  action.  If  existing 
provisions  of  the  Treaty,  or  of  Community  legislation are 
to  be  gIven  ef feet  In  the  standard  makIng  area  In  ways 
which  are  different  from  the  effect  normally  given  In 
other  areas,  such  extensIons  or' InterpretatIons  shou I d 
conveyed  with  the  Industries  concerned  In  a  fully 
transparent  manner. 
6.1 .4.  As  Indicated  In  paragraph  1.1 .4,  if  standard-making 
bodies  choose  to  elaborate  codes  of  practice  or 
undertakIngs  for  sIgnature  by  partIcIpants  In  the 
standard  mak 1 ng  process,  care  shou I d  be  taken  to 
distinguish  those  private  procedural  obi igations  arising 
from  membership  of  a  st~ndard-making  body  and  the 
obi lgations  under  public  law  which  the  body  or  Its 
members  may  incur. 
6. 1 . 5.  The  CommIssIon  has  exam I ned  a  number  of  the  codes  or 
guidelines  appl led  by  international  and  national 
standards-makIng  bodIes.  GIven  the  vo I untary  nature  of 
the  standard-makIng  process,  the  common  characterIstIcs 
of  most  such  codes  or  guide! lnes  are  that  they  are  non  -
bIndIng  and  remaIn  genera I  In  theIr  approach.  However, 
at  least  one  standard-making  body  has  attempted  to create 
a  binding  and  deta I I ed  Undertaking  which  sets  out  the 
mechanisms  for  regulating  the making  of  standards. - 31  -
6.1.6.  It can  be  argued  that  the  complexity  of  the  relationship 
between  standard-making  and  exclusive  Intellectual 
property  rights  requires  a  set  of  ru I es  which  foresees 
all  possible eventualities.  It can  equally  be  argued  that 
wIthout  constraInts  on  the  membershIp  of  the  standard-
making  body,  the  potent I a I  I y  conf I I ct  I ng  interests  of 
those  taking  part  In  the  process  cannot  be  reconcl led. 
6.1.7.  On  the  other  hand,  proponents  of  the  general  and 
vo 1  untary  approach  favoured  unt I I  now  by  most 
International  standardization  bodies  argue  that 
unnecessary  deta I I  in  such  guide I I nes  renders  the  process 
more  complex  than  It  need  be,  and  argue  that  no  evidence 
of  a  need  to  depart  from  the  voluntary  approach  has  been 
produced. 
6. 1. 8.  It  Is  not  for  the  CommIssIon  to  favour  one  approach 
rather  than  another,  providing  the  requirements  set  out 
In  paragraph  6.2.1.  below  are met. 
To  the  extent  that  standards-makIng  bodIes  are  prIvate 
and  vo I untary  organIsatIons,  they  are  free,  wIthIn  the 
limits  Imposed  by  Articles  85  and  86  of  the  Treaty,  to 
organize  their  actlvltes  In  the  way  which  seems  to  them 
to  be  most  appropriate.  However,  In  Imposing  constraints 
on  members,  standards  bodies  should  take  Into 
consideration  the  need  to  encourage  the  voluntary 
contributIon  by  Industry  of  Its  best  techno I ogy  toward 
the  standard-making  process.  The  Commission  has 
therefore  a  preference  for  a  system  based  on  trIed  and 
proven  principles,  but  which  balances  In  a  transparent 
and  equitable way  the  Interests of  those  concerned. - 32  -
6.2.  GENERAL  PRINCIPLES 
6.2.1.  The  Commission  suggests  that  rights  and  obi lgatlons arise 
for  both  standards  makers  and  Intellectual  property 
right  holders.  The  principles  on  which  standardization 
takes  place  should  therefore  recognize  that  partnership 
as  fo I I  OWS  : 
European  standard-making  bodies  should  ensure  that: 
1.  alI  persons  wishing  to  use  European  standards must 
be  given  access  to  those  standards; 
2.  standards  are  ava I I ab I e  for  use  on  faIr, 
reasonable  and  non-discriminatory  terms, 
regardless of  whether  the  users participate  In  the 
work  of  the  standard-making  body  or  not,  but 
taking  Into  account  the circumstances of  the  use; 
3.  users  are  able  to  use  the  above  standards  to 
manufacture  In  conformIty  wIth  the  standards  In 
the  CommunIty,  and  to  Import  Into  the  Community 
goods  legitimately manufactured  In  third countries 
In  conformity with  the  standards; 
4.  best  efforts  are  made  to  Identify  holders  of  any 
Intellectual  property  rights 
-by conducting  searches 
- by  publ lcatlon  of  adequate  Information  and  where 
appropriate  by  holding  publ lc  enquiries, 
before  adoptIng  a  standard,  work  on  a  part I cuI ar 
solution only  continuing  If  alI  known  Intellectual 
property  rIghts  can  be  1 I censed  for  use  In  the 
standard; 
5.  faIr  condItIons  are  provIded  to  the  hoI ders  of 
Intellectual  property  rights,  especially  with 
regard  to  the  time  I lmlts  for  Identifying  IPRs  and 
agreeing  to  their  use,  and  In  respect  of 
arbitration mechanisms  as  to  royalty  rates; 
Intellectual  property  right  holders  should: 
6.  use  best  efforts  to  Identify  In  a  timely  manner 
any  IPR  which  they  hold  which  Is  relevant  to  a 
standard  whIch  1 s  beIng  deve I oped  and  to  con f 1 rm 
or  refuse  permission  for  Its  Incorporation  In  that 
standard  promptly; 7. 
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offer  fair,  reasonable  and 
monetary  or  non-monetary  terms 
use  any  IPR; 
non-discriminatory 
for  the  I lcence  to 
8.  regard  agreement  to  the  Incorporation  of  an  IPR  In 
a  standard  as  I r revocab I e  un I ess  the  except I ona I 
circumstances  justify  withdrawal  of  licences  once 
the  standard  Is  adopted. 
6.3.  COMMUNITY  ACTION 
6.3.1.  The  Commission  may  find  itself  obi lged  to  consider 
whether  Articles' 30-36,  59,  66,  85  and  86  of  the  Treaty 
are  appl !cable  In  certain  cases.  Arbitration  procedures 
set  up  by  standard  bodIes,  wh I I st  usefu I  In  reso I vI ng 
d 1 sputes  In  certaIn  areas,  cannot  be  regarded  as  f Ina I 
and  bIndIng  upon  a I I  partIes  If  questIons  arIse  whIch 
fall  to  be  decided  by  application  of  provisions  of  the 
Treaty. 
6.3.2.  As  Indicated  earl ler  in  this  Communication,  the 
Commission  must  ensure  that  where  compl lance  with  a 
standard  or  part  of  a  standard  Is  referred  to  In 
Community  legislation,  either  as  a  mandatory  requirement 
or  as  one  which  confers  a  particular  status  under 
CommunIty  I aw,  the  contents  of  that  standard  are  made 
ava I I ab I e  to  a I I  Interested  part les  on  a  faIr,  reasonab I e 
and  non-discriminatory  basis.  This  obi lgatlon  derives 
from  both  Community  and  International  law. 
6.3.3.  Where  the  Commission  has  reason  to  bel leve  that  a 
standard  or  part  of  It  Is  not  being  made  aval lable  on 
these  terms  It  wl  I I  have  to  take  steps  to withhold  or  to 
withdraw  recognition  under  Community  law  of  the  standard. 
This  could  be  done  in  respect  of  Individual  standards  on 
an  ad  hoc  bas Is,  for  Instance,  by  the  pub I i cat I on  of 
notices  In  the Official  Journal. 
However,  If  a  European  standardIzatIon  body  consIstent I y 
failed  to  ensure  non-discriminatory  access  to  Its 
standards,  the  status  of  the  standardization  body  Itself 
under  Community  law  would  have  to  be  reviewed. ISSN 0254-1475 
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